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ABSTRACT: This study becomes the first to examine cointegration and causal effects between 
mass media and corruption in South Africa for interpolated quarterly data of the corruption 
perception index and the world press freedom index conducted between the period of 2002 and 
2014. The method of empirical investigation is the momentum threshold autoregressive 
(MTAR) model with a corresponding threshold error correction (TEC) component. Our 
empirical results reveal a negative long-run cointegration relationship between the two 
variables with causality running from corruption to the press freedom index. These findings 
explain why increased mass media has not resulted in a decline in corruption levels and rather 
suggests that a direct decline in levels of corruption would induce an increase in the freedom 
of mass media communication. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
A growing amount of academic literature worldwide is recognizing that effective mass 
media development is a crucial element of a country’s anti-corruption program. To be specific, 
mass media has been recognized as playing a dual role in the fight against corruption; those 
being, (1) raising public awareness about corruption, its causes, consequences and possible 
remedies and (2) the investigation as well as the reporting of incidences of corruption thus 
aiding other oversight and prosecutorial bodies (Sowunmi et. al. 2010). The effectiveness of 
media in fighting corruption depends on the access to information and freedom of expression 
as well as a professional and ethical cadre of investigative journalism (Stapenhurst, 2000). 
Moreover, mass media protocol can directly assist in creating a conducive environment for 
rooting out corruption through the enthronement of a culture of freedom of speech and freedom 
of expression; governmental accountability and qualitative civil society in direct participation 
in governance (Djankov, 2000).  
 
Following South Africa’s liberation election in 1994, there has been a dramatic 
upheaval of the mass media broadcasting environment, which is inclusive of the transformation 
of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) from a state-controlled broadcaster 
into an independent public service broadcaster; the establishment of an independent regulatory 
body, the independent broadcasting Authority (IBA) and the entry into this field a number of 
new private sector interests (Barnett, 1999). And even ith these developments, the levels of 
corruption in South Africa as indicated by transparency internationals (TI) corruption 
perception index (CPI) shows that political corruption levels within the economy has been on 
the rise since 2006. Furthermore, the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) annual South 
African’s Social Attitudes Survey shows that the proportion of people who think that tackling 
corruption should be a national priority has almost doubled from 14 percent to 26 percent over 
a five-year period dating between 2006 and 2011. Therefore, given this general rise in the level 
of development and sophistication of mass communication as well as a simultaneous rise in the 
levels of corruption at national government level within the South African economy, it is both 
thought provoking and surprising that no literature, to the best of our knowledge, has made an 
inquire into the possibility of a cointegration relationship between mass media communication 
and corruption for the South African economy.  
 Against this backdrop, the current study contributes to the ongoing body of knowledge 
by investigating cointegration and causality effects between mass communication and 
corruption in South Africa using the momentum threshold autoregressive (MTAR) model 
framework as pioneered by Enders and Granger (1998). The empirical analysis is conducted 
on interpolated quarterly data collected between the periods 2002/Q1 to 2014/Q4. We structure 
the rest of the paper as follows. The following section describes the MTAR econometric model 
used in the paper from which unit root testing procedures, cointegration and causality analysis 
are drawn from. The third section of the paper presents the data and the empirical analysis of 
the study whereas the final section of the paper concludes the study. 
 
2 EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
We specify our baseline model via the following long run regression: 
 
(
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Where CPIt is the corruption perception index, WPFIt is the world press freedom index 
and ϵti is the long run regression error term. According to the Engle and Granger’s (1987) 
cointegration theorem, long-run convergence along a steady state path can only exist if the time 
series variables CPIt and WPFIt are first difference stationary variables and the error term ϵti 
remains levels stationary. This condition would ensure that both time series variables increase 
monotonically over time such that any estimated regression based on the variables will not 
produce spurious results. In pursuit of Enders and Granger (1998), we model co-integration 
relations between the time series variables by allowing the regression residuals to behave like 
a threshold autoregressive (TAR) process i.e.  
 
𝛥ɛ𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡𝜌1𝜉𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝐼𝑡)𝜌2𝜉𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 ∆𝜉𝑡−𝑖 + µ𝑡     (2) 
 
And thereafter we apply the following tests for (i) normal co-integration effects; and 
(ii) asymmetric co-integration effects, which are respectively implemented under the following 
hypothesis: 
 
𝐻0
(𝑖)
∶  𝜌1 = 𝜌2 = 0           (3) 
 
𝐻0
(𝑖𝑖)
∶ 𝜌1 = 𝜌2           (4) 
 
Furthermore, we assign four indicator functions to the threshold cointegration equation 
(2). The first indicator function transforms the residuals of equation (2) into a TAR 
specification with a zero threshold: 
 
.𝑡 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓
𝑡−1
≥ 0
0, 𝑖𝑓
𝑡−1
< 0
          (5) 
 
Whereas the second indicator function is representative of a TAR specification with a 
consistently estimated threshold value (i.e. c-TAR): 
 
.𝑡 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 
𝑡−1
≥ 𝜏
0, 𝑖𝑓
𝑡−1
< 𝜏
          (6) 
 
The third indicator function transforms the residuals into a momentum threshold 
autoregressive (MTAR) model: 
 
𝑀.𝑡 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓
𝑡−1
≥ 0
0, 𝑖𝑓
𝑡−1
< 0
          (7) 
 
Whilst the fourth indicator function is representative of a MTAR specification with a 
consistently estimated threshold value (i.e. c-MTAR): 
 
𝑀.𝑡 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓
𝑡−1
≥ 𝜏
0, 𝑖𝑓
𝑡−1
< 𝜏
          (8) 
 
Since the value of the threshold variable, τ, under both the c-TAR and c-MTAR model 
specifications, is unknown a prior. Therefore, we apply Hansen’s (2000) grid search method to 
obtain a true estimate of the unknown threshold values. 
 
In the event that cointegration effects amongst the pair of time series variables can be 
verified, an error correction mechanism can be modelled between the time series variables. In 
conformity to our baseline MTAR model, we utilize two sets of corresponding threshold error 
correction (TEC) models. The first set are the TAR-TEC models which we specify as:  
 
∆𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡 = 11𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 + 12(1 − 𝐼𝑡)𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜑𝑖1∆𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡−1
𝑝
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝜓𝑖1∆𝑊𝑃𝐹𝐼𝑡
𝑝
𝑖=1 + ѵ𝑡1       (9) 
∆𝑊𝑃𝐹𝐼𝑡 = 11𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 + 12(1 − 𝐼𝑡)𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜑𝑖1∆𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡−1
𝑝
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝜓𝑖1∆𝑊𝑃𝐹𝐼𝑡
𝑝
𝑖=1 + ѵ𝑡1  (10) 
 
Whereas the second set are the MTAR-TEC models and specified as: 
 
∆𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡 = 11𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 + 12(1 − 𝐼𝑡)𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜑𝑖1∆𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡−1
𝑝
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝜓𝑖1∆𝑊𝑃𝐹𝐼𝑡
𝑝
𝑖=1 + ѵ𝑡1      (11) 
∆𝑊𝑃𝐹𝐼𝑡 = 11𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 + 12(1 − 𝐼𝑡)𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜑𝑖1∆𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡−1
𝑝
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝜓𝑖1∆𝑊𝑃𝐹𝐼𝑡
𝑝
𝑖=1 + ѵ𝑡1  (12) 
 
The indicator functions as given in regressions (5) through (8) are respectively applied 
to the TAR-TEC and MTAR-TEC specifications (9) through to (12). Through the above 
described systems of error correction models, the presence of asymmetries between the 
variables could initially be tested by examining the signs on the coefficients of the error 
correction terms; whereas granger causality tests can be implemented by using a standard F-
test to examine whether the regression coefficients from the error correction models are 
significantly different from zero. Pragmatically, the null hypothesis of no error correction 
mechanism can be tested as: 
 
𝐻0
(𝑖𝑖𝑖)
: +
𝑡−1
+ = −
𝑡−1
−                 (13) 
 
Whereas, the null hypothesis that the CPIt does not lead to WPFIt is tested as: 
 𝐻0
(𝑖𝑣)
: 𝜑𝑖1 = 0;  𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑘                (14) 
 
And the null hypothesis that the WPFIt does not lead to CPIt do not is tested as: 
 
𝐻0
(𝑣)
: 𝜓𝑖1 = 0;  𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑘                (15) 
 
3 DATA AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Our empirical data set comprises of the corruption perception index (CPIt) index and 
the world press freedom index (WPFIt). The first series is collected from the Transparency 
International (TI) online database whereas the second series is collected from the Reporter 
Without Borders online database. The data is collected on an annual basis ranging from 2002 
to 2014. Technically speaking, it would have been ideal to user a longer span of data, but due 
to data availability constraints, consistent annual data for the WPFI could only be collected 
from 2002 onwards. Therefore, in light of the scarcity of our empirical data we use a time series 
interpolation method to convert the yearly data into quarterly data for empirical use. Thereafter, 
as a preliminary step we employ the ADF and PP unit root tests to the empirical data as a means 
of evaluating the integration properties of the time series. Both unit root tests have been 
performed without a constant and without a trend. The results of the unit root tests, as reported 
in Table 1, confirm that both time series variables evolve as first difference stationary variables 
at significance levels of 99 percent. 
 
Table 1: ADF and PP unit root tests 
 Variables 
 CPI WPFI 
 ADF PP ADF PP 
 
levels 
 
-0.48 
 
0.79 
 
-1.83 
 
-2.71 
 
first differences 
 
-2.96* 
 
-5.12* 
 
-5.89* 
 
-8.78* 
Note: The asterix ‘*’ denotes the 1% significance level.  
 
Having this evidence of I(1) behaviour among all the times series variables, we proceed 
to apply various threshold cointegration and threshold error correction tests to formulated 
TAR-TEC, c-TAR-TEC, MTAR-TEC and c-MTAR-TEC estimation regressions with CPI as 
the dependent variable and then with WPFI as the dependent variable. We basically test each 
of the formulated threshold model regressions for (i) significant normal cointegration effects, 
and (ii) significant threshold cointegration effects and (iii) significant threshold error correction 
effects and then we report the results in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: Threshold Cointegration and Error Correction Tests Results 
 CPI WPFI 
hypothesis 𝐻0
(𝑖)
 
 
𝐻0
(𝑖𝑖)
 𝐻0
(𝑖𝑖𝑖)
 𝐻0
(𝑖)
 𝐻0
(𝑖𝑖)
 𝐻0
(𝑖𝑖𝑖)
 
model       
tar-tec 1.40 
(0.26) 
0.08 
(0.78) 
0.78 
(0.38) 
0.35 
(0.71) 
0.07 
(0.79) 
1.14 
(0.29) 
c-tar-tec 1.67 
(0.20) 
0.60 
(0.44) 
2.70 
(0.10)* 
0.45 
(0.64) 
0.27 
(0.61) 
0.97 
(0.33) 
mtar-tec 1.50 
(0.24) 
0.27 
(0.61) 
1.58 
(0.22) 
1.37 
(0.27) 
2.08 
(0.16) 
5.07 
(0.03)** 
c-mtar-tec 1.93 
(0.16) 
1.08 
(0.30) 
0.23 
(0.64) 
3.41 
(0.04)* 
6.11 
(0.02)* 
4.32 
(0.04)** 
Note: Significance level codes: ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote the 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels respectively. The p-values are reported in parentheses (). 
 
In referring to the results reported in Table 2, we observe that each of the threshold 
cointegration regressions fail to reject the first two tested hypotheses of normal cointegration 
and threshold cointegration effects, that is with the exception of the c-MTAR-TEC model with 
WPFI placed as the dependent variable in the model regression. Moreover, the c-MTAR-TEC 
model with WPFI as the dependent variable also manages to reject the null hypothesis of no 
threshold error correction effects. Therefore, in light of the empirical results obtained thus far, 
we are able to conclude that the most significant threshold cointegration regression is the c-
MTAR-TEC model with WPFI placed as the dependent variable. We thus proceed to provide 
empirical estimates of this model and report our findings in Table 3 below whereas results of 
the causality analysis performed for both the time series variables under the same c-MTAR-
TEC model are reported in Table 4. 
 
Table 3: c-MTAR-TEC estimates: WPFI as dependent variable 
 dependent variable 
 CPIt WPFIt 
α0i  34.75 
(0.03)* 
α1i  -5.12 
(0.02)** 
 
τ 
  
1.32 
 
ρ1ξt-1  -0.30 
(0.02)* 
ρ2ξt-1  -0.07 
(0.03)* 
β1∆ ξt-1  0.03 
(0.84) 
   
𝜆−𝜉𝑡−1
−  0.01 
(0.01)** 
0.07 
(0.45) 
∆𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡−𝑘
−  0.98 
(0.02)** 
17.70 
(0.09)* 
∆𝑊𝑃𝐹𝐼𝑡−𝑘
−  0.01 
(0.38) 
0.24 
(0.19) 
𝜆+𝜉𝑡−1
+  0.06 
(0.76) 
-0.01 
(0.01)** 
∆𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡−𝑘
+  -0.52 
(0.09)* 
-5.52 
(0.46) 
∆𝑊𝑃𝐹𝐼𝑡−𝑘
+  0.01 
(0.96) 
-1.03 
(0.00)*** 
DW statistic 1.88 
p-value 0.03 
LB 0.08 
JB 3.78 
Note: Significance level codes: ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote the 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels respectively. The p-values are reported in parentheses (). DW and LB denote the Durbin 
Watson and Ljung-Box test statistics for autocorrelation whereas JB denotes the Jarque Bera 
normality of the residuals. 
 
  
Table 4: Ganger Causality tests results 
Hypothesis f-statistic 
𝐻0
(𝑖𝑣)
: 𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑊𝑃𝐹𝐼 3.10 
(0.06)* 
𝐻0
(𝑣)
: 𝑊𝑃𝐹𝐼 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝐶𝑃𝐼 0.42 
(0.66) 
Note: The asterix ‘*’ denotes the 10% significance level. The p-values are reported in 
parentheses (). 
 
In summarizing the empirical results reported in Tables 3 and 4, we arrive at the 
following four conclusions. Firstly, as indicated by the negative OLS long-run regression 
coefficient, α1i, there exists a negative long-run cointegration relationship between the 
corruption index and press freedom index in which the press freedom index is the driving 
variable in the system. We particularly obtain a long run regression coefficient of -5.12 which 
indicates that a 1 percent reduction in the corruption index results in approximately a 5 percent 
increase in the press freedom index. Secondly, given that the threshold error term coefficient 
in the upper regime of the MTAR part of the model (i.e. ρ1ξt-1) is of grater absolute value in 
comparison to its lower regime counterparts (i.e. ρ2ξt-1), we deduce that positive deviations 
from the steady state are eliminated at a quicker rate than that of negative deviations. Thirdly, 
based on the estimated threshold error correction model, we find a significant long-run 
convergence of the residuals to the steady state equilibrium as depicted by the significantly 
negative error correction term found in the upper regime of the TEC regime (i.e. 𝜆+𝜉𝑡−1
+ ). We 
note that this significant negative error correction term only occurs when shocks to the system 
are driven by the press freedom index. Lastly, the causality tests show that the null hypothesis 
of the corruption index not granger causing the press freedom index is rejected at a 10 percent 
significance level whereas the null hypothesis of the freedom press index granger causing the 
corruption index cannot be rejected at all levels of significance. This specific result points to a 
uni-directional causality running one-way from the corruption index to the press freedom 
index. 
 
4 CONCLUSION 
 
Primarily motivated by the absence of academic evidence depicting the empirical 
relationship between mass media and corruption in South Africa, our study endeavoured into 
investigating threshold cointegration and causality effects between the time series variables for 
interpolated quarterly data collected from 2002 to 2014. Our overall empirical study reveals a 
number of interesting phenomenon. Firstly, the negative long-run cointegration relationship 
established between the corruption index and press freedom index signifies an inverse 
relationship existing between the time series variables in which they move in opposite 
directions over the long-run. We specifically find that a percentage decrease (increase) in the 
corruption index leads to a five percent increase (decrease) in the press freedom index. 
Secondly, and more importantly, we find causality effects running uni-directional from the 
corruption index to the press freedom index. This implies that greater press freedom can lead 
to less corruption in South Africa but not vice versa. A plausible explanation for this outcome 
may be attributed to the controversial Secrecy bill which is essentially a piece of legislation 
that inhibits freedom of mass media expression in South Africa and provides a statutory 
provision or platform for covering up some of the corruption issues within government. So 
whilst this study proves that mass media is significantly related to levels of corruption within 
the South African economy, we conclude that only through a reduction in the levels corruption 
can there be higher freedom in mass media reporting and yet press freedom in isolation cannot 
decrease levels of corruption within the economy.. 
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